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ABSTRACT 
 
Effects of Training on Employee Suggestions and 
Promotions in an Internal Labor Market* 
 
We evaluate the effects of employer-provided formal training on employee suggestions for 
productivity improvements and on promotions among male blue-collar workers. More than 
twenty years of personnel data of four entry cohorts in a German company allow us to 
address issues such as unobserved heterogeneity and the length of potential training effects. 
Our main finding is that workers have larger probabilities to make suggestions and to be 
promoted after they have received formal training. The effect on suggestions is however only 
short term. Promotion probabilities are largest directly after training but also seem to be 
affected in the long term. 
 
 
JEL Classification: J24, M53 
  
Keywords: human capital, insider econometrics, productivity, promotions, training 
 
 
Corresponding author: 
 
Christian Pfeifer 
Leuphana University Lüneburg 
Scharnhorststr. 1 
C4.220b 
21335 Lüneburg 
Germany 
E-mail: christian.pfeifer@uni.leuphana.de  
 
                                                 
* This work was financially supported by the VolkswagenStiftung. We thank seminar participants at 
Leuphana University Lüneburg, University Paderborn, and 14th Colloquium in Personnel Economics in 
Zurich for their comments. 
1 
 
1. Introduction 
Returns on human capital investments have received large attention in policy and 
research over recent decades (e.g., Bartel, 1995; Bishop, 1997; Bartel, 2000; Asplund, 
2005; Frazis and Loewenstein, 2005). Next to schooling, human capital accumulation 
after entry into the labor market is considered key to economic performance at both the 
micro and the macro level. Research however faces some problems when studying the 
impact of employer-provided formal training on workers’ productivity. Problems 
include the aggregation of heterogeneous training types across industries and firms as 
well as the lack of adequate variables to proxy productivity. For example, survey data of 
workers compare individuals across firms with different training programs and often use 
workers’ wage increases as a proxy for productivity increases. Whereas wages might 
indeed be good proxies for productivity in perfect labor markets, they are obviously not 
so in imperfect labor markets. Survey data of firms, on the other hand, comprise only 
information about aggregated productivity (e.g., sales), which allows a comparison 
between firms but not between workers. Moreover, survey data often suffer from 
imprecise or even false statements about wages, training, and other variables. To 
overcome some of these problems, researchers have recently used personnel records of 
single firms. Although personnel data sets are not representative and are only 
econometric case studies ('insider econometrics'), they have the advantage of comparing 
workers in the same environment (firm, job, training) and of unbiased information about 
wages, productivity, and training. 
Another potential problem when evaluating causal effects of training is that training 
participation is likely to be non-random. Thus, if participation depends on unobservable 
characteristics, a cross-section comparison between workers who participate in training 
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and workers who do not participate is likely to suffer from omitted variable or selection 
bias. Panel data that exploit within variances can help to deal with this problem, because 
first differences or conventional fixed effects estimators address the issue of unobserved 
heterogeneity. More precisely, outcomes such as wages or productivity of a specific 
worker are compared before and after training. A number of empirical studies have 
recently used longitudinal data to close the research gap, but most attempts still suffer 
from measurement and aggregation biases in survey data. Moreover, few datasets 
provide sufficient long panels to be able to exploit the time dimension in more detail. 
But the length of training effects in particular is important to get an understanding of 
actual depreciation rates of human capital investments, which are largely unexplored. 
In this paper, we evaluate the causal effects of training at the lowest micro level by 
using personnel records from one German company. The data allows us to follow 415 
male blue-collar workers, who entered the company during the late 1970s, over the 
majority of their working life, i.e., for more than twenty years. In addition to 
information about participation in formal training courses, our data set provides unique 
information about employee suggestions that are of productive value for the firm. 
Although we cannot calculate returns on investments (ROI) due to missing information 
about training costs, actual benefits and costs of the implementation of suggestions, we 
think that the analysis of training effects on the probability to make suggestions is still 
important. First, employee suggestions have not been used previously to study training 
effects and are an interesting alternative to the often used supervisors’ performance 
ratings in personnel data, which might suffer from subjectivity bias. Second, employee 
suggestions are important for firms to permanently improve the efficiency of their 
production processes. Although training and suggestion systems are often idiosyncratic 
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to firms, the question as to whether training increases the probability of making 
suggestions for productivity improvements is of a general nature. 
We further analyze training effects on promotions, which are defined as upward 
movement from one wage group to another and are hence associated with a wage 
increase. Promotions are important from the point of view of both employer and 
employee. Employees benefit from promotions by monetary gains and higher 
reputation, whereas employers can use promotions to make efficient job assignments. 
On the one hand, training can serve as a screening device without increasing individual 
productivity, i.e., the firm learns about abilities and skills of workers and can promote 
the best fitting (most productive) worker to the next job in the hierarchy. On the other 
hand, training might indeed increase individual productivity by teaching skills and 
knowledge that are important to fulfill tasks at higher job levels.   
In order to estimate the causal effects of formal training on the likelihood of workers 
making suggestions and getting promotions, we use individual fixed effects linear 
probability and logit models. Our fixed effects approach helps to mitigate problems 
stemming from unobserved heterogeneity and non-random training participation. We 
further exploit the length of the panel by constructing four lagged training variables that 
allow us to analyze the length of training effects. Thus, we are able to identify whether 
the effects of training on productivity and promotions are short term or long term. The 
main findings of our econometric case study are that past training participation has 
significant positive effects on present suggestion and promotion probabilities. Training 
has the largest impact on suggestion and promotion probabilities in the year directly 
after participation. The further in the past the training participation has been, the more 
the training effect decreases in size and significance. This finding emphasizes the 
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importance on the provision of employer-provided training throughout working life and 
not only in the early years of employment. 
This paper is structured as follows. The next section summarizes previous empirical 
findings on the effects of employer-provided training. Section 3 informs about the 
personnel data set, provides descriptive statistics, and discusses the econometric 
framework. Section 4 presents the estimation results. The paper concludes with a short 
summary and a discussion of the results in Section 5. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Following the pioneering contributions by Becker (1962) and Mincer (1974), a 
substantial body of economic literature on human capital investments has addressed the 
determinants1 and outcomes of training. A reason for the continuously growing number 
of empirical studies on the outcomes of training is rooted in recent advancements in 
overcoming methodological challenges and new data when trying to identify a causal 
effect of training participation. 
The methodological problem in the attempt to evaluate training effects is based upon the 
potential endogeneity of the training variable. One source of this endogeneity stems 
from the concern about selection bias. Training participation is expected to be unevenly 
distributed across workers with different abilities. Workers and firms are likely to select 
those workers for training, for whom the expected returns are most favorable (Leuven 
and Oosterbeek, 2002). Endogeneity of the training variable might lead to omitted 
variable bias. If training represents one of many determinants of wages and 
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productivity, the training effects could be over- or underestimated (Barron et al., 1989). 
To correct for endogeneity, recent empirical training literature mainly draws on 
methodological approaches such as a Heckman-type selection (Lynch, 1992; Veum, 
1995), instrumental variables (Leuven and Oosterbeek, 2002), or fixed effects 
estimation (Booth, 1993; Barron et al., 1999).  
Despite the improved methodological approaches to correct for endogeneity, data 
availability still represents a major problem for three main reasons. First, few studies 
find instruments which arguably affect training, yet not the outcome variable (Leuven 
and Oosterbeek, 2004). Second, most panel data sets are relatively short so that either 
variation is low or training cases are rare (Dearden et al., 2006). Short panels also do not 
allow inference about the length of training effects through the use of lagged variables 
(Frazis and Loewenstein, 2005). Third, despite increased efforts to find adequate 
measurements of training participation, few studies obtain distinct outcome variables, 
which unambiguously denote promotions in hierarchy and productivity on the 
individual level (Bartel, 2000).  
Most empirical studies on training outcomes have addressed the wage effects of training 
participation (Bishop, 1997; Bartel, 2000; Asplund, 2005). The investigation of the 
effects of training on workers’ promotions in hierarchies and on productivity has not 
received as much attention. The main explanation is that wages, according to traditional 
human capital theory, serve as an adequate proxy for hierarchy and productivity. In 
perfect labor markets, wages are equal to the value of marginal products of workers 
(Becker, 1962). Accordingly, promotions serve as recognitions of workers’ increased 
productivities (Frazis and Loewenstein, 2005). However, in imperfect labor markets, 
employers are able to pay employees below their marginal product (Acemoglu and 
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Pischke, 1998). Increased wages from training participation would then fail to proxy the 
enhanced productivity of workers. Also, several empirical studies find significant 
variations of wages within job levels (Baker et al., 1994a, 1994b; Lazear and Oyer, 
2007). Hence, a wage increase is not necessarily associated with more responsibility at 
work or a shift to higher job levels. For this reason, recent empirical literature 
emphasizes the need to distinguish between wages, promotions, and productivity 
(Asplund, 2005). 
Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) use survey data of the National Longitudinal Study of 
Youth and the Employer Opportunity Pilot Project to evaluate the effect of training on 
subsequent promotions. Promotions are self-reported by workers and indicate if they 
have received a promotion in hierarchy or whether their job responsibilities have 
increased. The authors estimate fixed effects regressions and find positive effects of 
current and past training participation on promotion probabilities. Surveys entail, 
however, subjective responses of individuals, which are likely to be subject to 
measurement errors (Bartel, 1995). Furthermore, the training variable underlies 
significant heterogeneity so that questions remain as to how adequate the aggregation of 
different training types is, despite the effort to enhance the informational value of 
training measures through the observation of hours spent on training spells. 
Krueger and Rouse (1998) examine the impact of workplace education programs for 
one blue-collar and one white-collar company. They limit training heterogeneity by 
observing one standardized type of training form, which is partially governmentally 
financed and undertaken at the local community college between 1991 and 1995. By 
estimating an ordered probit model, the authors find that trained workers are much more 
likely to make job bids and to receive job upgrades in comparison to untrained workers. 
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Yet, the results suffer from a relatively low number of observations and insufficient 
panel length. Instead of using econometric approaches to limit selection bias, they have 
to assume that selection is controlled for by sufficient information on observed 
characteristics.    
Most empirical studies on training effects on productivity use industry data or matched 
employer–employee data (Bartel, 2000). This slowly growing branch of literature 
typically makes use of the standard Cobb–Douglas production function and observes 
firms over several years.2 In general, most of these studies find positive effects of the 
share of trained workers on labor productivity, which diminishes with the inclusion of 
human resource management characteristics. Few empirical studies have, however, 
looked at productivity effects of training participation at the individual worker level.   
Pischke (2001) uses data from the German Socio Economic Panel from 1986 to 1989. 
He observes detailed information on workers’ participation in formal training programs. 
As a training outcome, the author makes use of workers’ responses on benefits from 
training participation. He finds support for a positive effect of formal training on self-
reported performances of workers and interprets this finding as increased productivity. 
Despite the comprehensive design of the training variable, his results are questionable 
with respect to the implication for productivity. 
Bartel (1995) recommends the use of data from personnel records of a single firm 
(econometric case study) for three main reasons. First, personnel records provide exact 
training time and type. Second, training of workers is done by the same firm, 
corresponding to more homogeneous training measures. Third, workers’ outcomes are 
more comparable if they work for the same firm. Bartel (1995) uses personnel records 
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from a large manufacturing company from 1986 to 1990. To determine the effect of 
training on productivity, she uses information on performance evaluations by 
supervisors. Formal training has a positive and significant effect on the performance 
evaluations of workers, from which she draws the conclusion that formal training has a 
productivity-increasing effect. The short panel does not, however, allow any 
implications on the length of training effects, and supervisors’ performance ratings 
might suffer from potential biases such as subjectivity. A recent study by Breuer and 
Kampkötter (2010) uses three years of personnel records from a German multinational 
company and fixed effects methods. The main finding is that training only has a positive 
effect on several performance-related outcomes in the same year that training 
participation takes place. The research design might however suffer from the short panel 
length.   
In sum, the potential endogeneity of the training variable demands sophisticated 
econometric methods in order to determine the causal effects of training participation on 
distinct outcomes such as wages, promotions, and productivity. Although several 
approaches to estimate causal effects exist, data availability represents a major problem. 
Panels are usually rather short so that the variation of training and outcomes is low. 
Furthermore, few data sets offer persuasive information with regard to training and 
outcome variables. The training variable in survey data is usually aggregated through 
heterogeneous training types across firms and industries. As training outcomes, most 
empirical papers use wages to proxy hierarchy or productivity, and those which actually 
observe hierarchy and productivity rely on either heterogeneous outcomes or subjective 
evaluations. We complement existing studies by using an insider econometric approach 
with long balanced panel data for one firm, which comprise unique information about 
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training and outcomes such as employee suggestions and promotions. The data set 
allows us to apply fixed effects estimation techniques with lagged training variables to 
make inference about the length of training effects.      
 
3. Personnel Data, Variables, and Econometric Method  
We analyze the personnel records of a large company from the energy sector located in 
Western Germany. The company is subject to a collective contract and has a works 
council. Due to data protection reasons we are neither allowed to name the company nor 
to give detailed information. The data comprise yearly information about a subsample 
of 438 blue-collar workers in the company’s mining business, who entered the firm in 
four subsequent cohorts from 1976 until 1979 and stayed in the company over the entire 
observation period up to the year 2002. The sample represents a share of about a quarter 
of all employees in the company’s operation unit and 3.5 percent of the company’s 
entire workforce.  
For our analysis, we restrict the sample to German male blue-collar workers without 
missing values in the used variables. This restriction reduces our sample by 5 percent to 
415 different workers. As we are interested in the long term effects of training, we use 
four lags of training participation so that the first four yearly observations of every 
worker are dropped from the estimation sample. Moreover, all observations from the 
last observation year 2002 are dropped from the estimation sample, because no 
promotion variable can be constructed. The final sample contains 8,469 yearly 
observations of 415 different workers.3 Nearly 20 percent of these blue-collar workers 
do not have any secondary school degree, about 72 percent have the lowest secondary 
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school degree (Volks-/Hauptschulabschluss), and about 8 percent have at least 
successfully completed medium secondary school (Realschule). We further know that 
about a quarter of these workers have no apprenticeship qualification, about a quarter 
have completed their apprenticeship in the analyzed company, and the remaining 50 
percent have  performed their apprenticeship in other firms. 
Formal employer-provided training in the company is divided in four different types: 
(1) short training course (kurze Schulung) (one or two days); (2) longer training course 
(längere Schulung) (up to several weeks); (3) longer vocational re-training (längere 
Umschulung) (up to several weeks); and (4) longer academy of vocational training 
(Berufsakademie) (up to several weeks). We observe a total of 626 training cases. More 
than two thirds are short training courses, whereas the other training types are nearly 
equally distributed. Due to the rather small number of cases in most training types, we 
use a binary variable that takes the value one if a worker participated in any kind of 
training. To reduce heterogeneity in the training courses, we also analyze the effects of 
short training courses separately. Unfortunately, we do not have information about the 
direct and indirect costs of these training courses or about their actual contents. We 
know however that workers are paid during the training period and do not have to cover 
any direct costs. Thus, all costs are covered by the employer. 
In order to evaluate the effects of formal training in the company, we use two outcome 
variables. The first outcome is a binary variable that indicates if a worker makes a 
suggestion. These suggestions are of productive value for the firm and workers receive 
monetary rewards for them. Unfortunately, we do not know more about the value of the 
suggestions and of potential implementation costs. As we analyze blue-collar workers in 
the mining business, it seems likely that most suggestions are about more efficient work 
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arrangements. Formal training courses might teach new aspects in work arrangements or 
stimulate thoughts about the current work arrangements so that workers might have 
larger probabilities to make suggestions after such training. We observe 356 suggestions 
by workers, which results in a yearly average of about 4 percent. The second outcome 
variable to assess the training effects is a binary variable that indicates if a worker gets 
promoted from one wage group in a given year (t) to a higher wage group in the 
subsequent year (t+1). The underlying wage groups are obtained from the collective 
contract and promotions are by definition associated with a significant wage increase, 
which might be explained by a productivity increase due to training. We observe 511 
promotions, which results in a yearly average of about 6 percent.  
Since we have introduced our main variables, we can turn to our econometric 
framework that is described in equation (1). In principal, we estimate the impact of 
lagged training participation T of worker i on his outcomes Y in year t, which are worker 
suggestions and promotions. We further include a set of time variant control variables X 
(age in years, squared age divided by 100, wage groups as continuous variable), time 
fixed effects t , and worker fixed effects i . it  is the usual error term. The parameters 
to be estimated are denoted with β and δ. Descriptive statistics of the variables are 
presented in Table 1.  
 1 , 1 2 , 2 3 , 3 4 , 4it i t i t i t i t it t i itY T T T T X                     (1) 
- insert Table 1 about here 
The coefficients of interest are the βs, which are the effects of formal employer-
provided training on the probability that a worker makes a suggestion or gets promoted. 
Using the lags of training participation has the advantage of estimating the correct 
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causal direction, because past training participation has to affect current outcomes. 
Moreover, a comparison of the βs allows inference about the length of training effects. 
The inclusion of time and worker fixed effects reduces efficiency of the estimates but 
makes it more likely that estimates of the βs are consistent because omitted variable 
biases are reduced. Since worker fixed effects are jointly significant in all estimated 
specifications and Hausman tests reject the null hypothesis of no systematic differences 
with random effects estimates, we choose to use only fixed effects models. Because of 
potential problems in fixed effects probit and logit models, we prefer to estimate fixed 
effects linear probability models (LPM) using ordinary least squares. As a robustness 
check, a fixed effects (conditional) logit model is applied, which supports the findings 
from the linear models. According to Angrist (2001) linear models can be appropriate 
even for limited dependent variables if the main objective is to estimate causal effects 
and not structural parameters. 
In order to provide consistent effects for the βs, the Ti,t1 to Ti,t4  must be strictly 
exogenously conditional on our variables in Xit  and the unobserved effects i, i.e., Ti,t1 
to Ti,t4  must be uncorrelated not only with it  but also with  i,t1 and  i,t1. In our case, 
one might argue that the firm selects a worker for training because the worker made a 
particularly good suggestion in the former period, which signals his ability to the 
employer. If this were the case, Ti,t1 to Ti,t4  should be correlated with  i,t1 and, 
consequently, our estimates of β would not be consistent. Therefore, we carried out a 
test of strict exogeneity proposed by Wooldridge (2002, p. 285). The test is performed 
by incorporating Ti,t1 into regression equation (1). Under strict exogeneity, the 
coefficient of Ti,t1 should not be significantly different from zero. As we cannot find a 
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significant effect of Ti,t1 in any of our specifications, we are confident that the 
assumption of strict exogeneity is fulfilled in our fixed effects regressions.  
 
4. Estimation Results 
The estimation results for the probability of employee suggestions are presented in 
Table 2. The first four specifications are estimated using fixed effects linear regressions 
(LPM) for the complete sample. Specification one includes only the first lagged training 
participation variable and no time fixed effects (year dummies). The predicted 
probability to make a suggestion for an average worker without training is about 4 
percent and for an average worker, who has received training during the last year, it is 
about 6.6 percent. The absolute marginal effect of 2.6 percentage points is of statistical 
significance (p=0.011) and of economic importance (relative marginal effect is 2.6/4=65 
percent). Specification two includes additional time fixed effects, which are jointly 
significant in an F-test. The estimated training effect is only slightly reduced to 2.4 
percentage points. Specification three includes the complete four lags of training 
participation and no time fixed effects, and specification four also includes the time 
fixed effects. It can be seen that the marginal effect of the first lag is slightly reduced to 
2.4 and 2.2 percentage points but is still highly significant. The other three lags, i.e., 
training participation at least two years ago, have no significant effect on the suggestion 
probability.  
- insert Table 2 about here 
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The last column in Table 2 includes a robustness check concerning the method and 
sample. A fixed effects (conditional) logit model for the complete specification (all lags 
of training and time fixed effects) is estimated on a subsample of workers who have 
actually made a suggestion in the observation period. The estimated coefficients support 
the findings from the linear estimates that only the first training lag has a significant 
effect. A noteworthy result of the estimates in Table 2 is the inverted u-shape effect of 
age on the suggestion probability, which has its maximum around the ages 35 to 40 
years. If suggestions are related to productivity, this finding is consistent with concave 
productivity-age profiles known from other studies. In combination with the result that 
the training effect on suggestions as proxy for productivity is only short term, one might 
conclude that it is important for the employability of aging workers to invest more in 
their human capital.   
Table 3 informs about the estimation results for the probability that a worker gets 
promoted, which is associated with a significant wage increase. Specification one (first 
lag, no time fixed effects) reveals an absolute marginal effect of 7.7 percentage points 
due to training in the last year, which is highly significant. An average worker without 
training has a predicted promotion probability of 5.5 percent, whereas an average 
worker with training has a predicted promotion probability of 13.2 percent. The 
estimated training effect is with 8.25 percentage points even larger, if time fixed effects 
are included in specification two. Specifications three and four include all four lags of 
training participation. The estimated effects for the first training lag do not change 
significantly. Furthermore, the effect of the second lag is not significant, whereas the 
effects of the third and fourth lags are significant again. The third lag has a marginal 
effect of about 4 percentage points and the fourth lag of about 3 percentage points. But 
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if these effects are compared with the effect of the first lag, it emerges that they have 
only half the size. The last column in Table 3 includes again a fixed effects (conditional) 
logit model for the complete specification (all lags of training and time fixed effects), 
which is estimated on a subsample of workers who have actually been promoted in the 
observation period. The estimated coefficients support the findings from the linear 
regressions. We further find in all specifications that workers at higher wage groups are 
less likely to be promoted. 
- insert Table 3 about here 
One might argue that suggestions and promotions are related to each other. For 
example, supervisors might be more likely to choose a worker for promotion who has 
recently made a suggestion. Therefore, the linear estimates for the complete 
specification (all lags of training and time fixed effects) have been repeated with 
additional control variables that include four lags of promotions in the suggestion 
regression and vice versa. Because these variables have no significant effects and the 
results already presented in Tables 2 and 3 virtually do not change, the estimation 
results of this robustness check are only presented in the Appendix (see Table A.1). 
In a next step, we concentrate on short training courses to further reduce heterogeneity 
in the training variable. Short training courses are one or two day courses and make up 
about two thirds of all observed training cases in the data. For suggestion and promotion 
probabilities, we estimate fixed effects linear models for the complete sample as well as 
fixed effects logit models for subsamples of workers actually making a suggestion or 
being promoted in the observation period. The results are presented in Table 4 and are 
in general consistent with our previous findings on aggregated training. But two 
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noteworthy differences arise. First, the effect of short training on suggestions is larger 
and significant for the last two years. Second, the effect of short training on promotions 
is smaller. These differences between short training and aggregated training might be 
explained by different course contents and aims. Short training courses are likely to be 
more concerned with improvements of current work arrangements and less with 
teaching completely new skills (e.g., re-training), which might however be important to 
obtain better paid jobs in the firm’s hierarchy. Consequently, career-orientated longer 
training courses might indeed be more attractive for younger workers. On the other 
hand, short training courses, which seem to have only short term effects on productivity, 
are still important for older workers (skill updating, employability) and justified from an 
economic perspective because shorter amortization periods of old workers should play a 
minor role if depreciation rates are that large. 
- insert Table 4 about here 
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have used unique personnel records of a German company to evaluate 
the effects of formal employer-provided training on employee suggestions and 
promotions. Following this ‘insider econometric approach’, we could address issues 
such as training course heterogeneity and unobserved worker heterogeneity. We have 
found significant positive but only short term effects of training on the probability to 
make suggestions, which indicate a high depreciation rate in this dimension. Moreover, 
we have found that training participation increases the promotion probability. Overall, 
the results are consistent with the human capital argument that training increases 
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workers’ productivities. The rather short term effect raises, however, the question of 
whether depreciation rates are larger than previously assumed and ROIs smaller than 
often computed. If this were the case, the often stated argument that old workers receive 
no training due to short amortization periods would not be that convincing anymore. 
Because we have used only a sample of blue-collar workers in one single firm and 
qualitative information about employee suggestions and promotions in an econometric 
case study, we cannot give concluding answers to this question. But we hope for more 
studies to come that use long panels of personnel data.  
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1 For literature reviews on the determinants of training participation see Becker (1993), Leuven and 
Oosterbeek (1999), Neumark and Washer (2001), Leuven (2004), and Metcalf (2004).   
2 Empirical literature on the plant level uses mainly survey data of firms in the United States (Black and 
Lynch, 1996; Black and Lynch, 2001), UK (Dearden et al., 2006), Italy (Conti, 2005), Germany (Zwick, 
2002), and Ireland (Barrett and O’Connell, 2001). 
3 The number of workers is n=105 for the entry cohort 1976. The observations included in the estimation 
sample for entry cohort 1976 ranges from 1980 to 2001, which leads to a panel length in years of T=22. 
For entry cohort 1977: n=96, T=21. For entry cohort 1978: n=77, T=20. For entry cohort 1979: n=137, 
T=19. 
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Appendix 
Table A.1: Trainings effects when controlling for promotion and suggestion 
(1) Suggestion (2) Promotion    
Training in t-1  0.0221** 0.0826*** 
(0.0107) (0.0150)    
Training in t-2 0.0102 0.0161    
(0.0101) (0.0133)    
Training in t-3 0.0010 0.0410*** 
(0.0088) (0.0133)    
Training in t-4 -0.0037 0.0298**  
(0.0082) (0.0133)    
Age 0.0081** -0.0003    
(0.0033) (0.0053)    
Age squared / 100 -0.0114** 0.0063    
(0.0049) (0.0076)    
Wage group  -0.0014 -0.0391*** 
(0.0014) (0.0030)    
Promotion in t-1  0.0009                 
(0.0092)                 
Promotion in t-2 0.0068                 
(0.0092)                 
Promotion in t-3 -0.0073                 
(0.0074)                 
Promotion in t-4 0.0029                 
(0.0076)                 
Suggestion in t-1  0.0129    
(0.0154)    
Suggestion in t-2 0.0162    
(0.0162)    
Suggestion in t-3 0.0041    
(0.0158)    
Suggestion in t-4 -0.0118    
(0.0145)    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes 
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes 
R² 0.1891 0.1143    
F value 7.5492 9.6402    
Number of observations 8469 8469    
Number of workers 415 415 
Notes: Coefficients of fixed effects linear probability model. Robust standard 
errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Tables included in text 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics 
Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
Suggestion in t (dummy) 0.0420 0.2007 0 1 
Promotion in t (dummy) 0.0603 0.2381 0 1 
Training in t-1 (dummy) 0.0661 0.2485 0 1 
Training in t-2 (dummy) 0.0653 0.2471 0 1 
Training in t-3 (dummy) 0.0634 0.2437 0 1 
Training in t-4 (dummy) 0.0582 0.2342 0 1 
Short training in t-1 (dummy) 0.0433 0.2036 0 1 
Short training in t-2 (dummy) 0.0413 0.1991 0 1 
Short training in t-3 (dummy) 0.0367 0.1881 0 1 
Short training in t-4 (dummy) 0.0314 0.1744 0 1 
Age in t (years) 33.4290 6.5271 19 53 
Age squared / 100 11.6010 4.4034 3.61 28.09 
Wage group in t 7.0461 2.7482 2 19 
Notes: Number of yearly observations is 8469 from 415 blue-collar workers. 
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Table 2: Effects of training on employee suggestions 
(1) LPM (2) LPM (3) LPM (4) LPM (5) Logit   
Training in t-1  0.0260** 0.0238** 0.0240** 0.0221** 0.4000*   
(0.0102) (0.0102) (0.0105) (0.0104) (0.2310)    
Training in t-2 0.0098 0.0113 0.2354    
(0.0098) (0.0097) (0.2448)    
Training in t-3 -0.0036 0.0002 -0.0245    
(0.0086) (0.0086) (0.2750)    
Training in t-4 -0.0107 -0.0036 -0.1174    
(0.0080) (0.0079) (0.3034)    
Age 0.0221*** 0.0080** 0.0221*** 0.0080** 0.2367    
(0.0025) (0.0033) (0.0025) (0.0033) (0.2137)    
Age squared / 100 -0.0282*** -0.0113** -0.0282*** -0.0114** -0.1575    
(0.0037) (0.0049) (0.0037) (0.0049) (0.2777)    
Wage group  -0.0007 -0.0012 -0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0182    
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0734)    
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes 
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.1778 0.1888 0.1781 0.1889             
F value 43.7426 9.6093 25.3282 8.5678             
Pseudo R² (McFadden) 0.1596    
Chi² value 255.9914   
Number of observations 8469 8469 8469 8469 2979    
Number of workers 415 415 415 415 146 
Notes: Mean yearly suggestion probability for an average worker without training is approximately 4 
percent. Coefficients of fixed effects linear probability model for specifications (1) to (4) and fixed effects 
(conditional) logit model for specification (5). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
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Table 3: Effects of training on promotions 
(1) LPM (2) LPM (3) LPM (4) LPM (5) Logit   
Training in t-1  0.0774*** 0.0825*** 0.0783*** 0.0830*** 0.9977*** 
(0.0148) (0.0148) (0.0150) (0.0150) (0.1535)    
Training in t-2 0.0124 0.0165 0.2420    
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.1805)    
Training in t-3 0.0390*** 0.0415*** 0.6637*** 
(0.0133) (0.0133) (0.1746)    
Training in t-4 0.0318** 0.0298** 0.4640**  
(0.0132) (0.0133) (0.1881)    
Age 0.0009 0.0012 0.0019 -0.0001 -0.0640    
(0.0042) (0.0054) (0.0042) (0.0054) (0.1031)    
Age squared / 100 0.0020 0.0044 0.0004 0.0061 0.2671*   
(0.0061) (0.0076) (0.0061) (0.0076) (0.1552)    
Wage group  -0.0383*** -0.0381*** -0.0393*** -0.0392*** -0.4447*** 
(0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0030) (0.0395)    
Year fixed effects No Yes No Yes Yes 
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.1023 0.1109 0.1051 0.1139             
F value 47.5890 11.7954 29.4158 11.0083             
Pseudo R² (McFadden) 0.1229    
Chi² value 326.5321   
Number of observations 8469 8469 8469 8469 5757    
Number of workers 415 415 415 415 281 
Notes: Mean yearly promotion probability for an average worker without training is approximately 5.5 
percent. Coefficients of fixed effects linear probability model for specifications (1) to (4) and fixed effects 
(conditional) logit model for specification (5). Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** 
p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
 
 
 
 
26 
 
Table 4: Effects of short training 
Suggestion Promotion 
(1) LPM (2) Logit (3) LPM (4) Logit 
Short training in t-1  0.0375*** 0.5419** 0.0299** 0.5092**  
(0.0144) (0.2556) (0.0143) (0.2409)    
Short training in t-2 0.0325** 0.5304* -0.0066 -0.3523    
(0.0140) (0.2722) (0.0118) (0.3074)    
Short training in t-3 0.0051 -0.0009 0.0248* 0.4534*   
(0.0121) (0.3292) (0.0147) (0.2694)    
Short training in t-4 0.0131 0.2874 0.0160 0.2497    
(0.0122) (0.3647) (0.0163) (0.2844)    
Age 0.0077** 0.2196 0.0010 -0.0218    
(0.0033) (0.2139) (0.0054) (0.1014)    
Age squared / 100 -0.0112** -0.1399 0.0045 0.1854    
(0.0049) (0.2780) (0.0076) (0.1527)    
Wage group  -0.0020 -0.0356 -0.0387*** -0.4161*** 
(0.0013) (0.0733) (0.0031) (0.0378)    
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Worker fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R² 0.1904 0.1053                
F value 8.7319 10.0131                
Pseudo R² (McFadden) 0.1625 0.1017    
Chi² value 260.6811 270.1058    
Number of observations 8469 2979 8469 5757    
Number of workers 415 146 415 281  
Notes: Coefficients of fixed effects linear probability model for specifications (1) and (3) and fixed 
effects (conditional) logit model for specifications (2) and (4). Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
 
 
 
 
